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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Driving Under the 
Influence of an Alcoholic Beverage after a jury trial which was 
held on January 26, 1988, and the Judgment of Conviction, which 
was rendered against the Appellant on February 22, 1988, by the 
Honorable Mark S. Johnson, Fourth Circuit Court for Davis County. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Whether or not the failure of the Trial Court to 
instruct the jury on the definition of the term "actual physical 
control", an element of the offense charged, Driving Under the 
Influence of an Alcoholic Beverage, constitutes reversible error. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was charged by Information with driving or 
being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on November 
10, 1987. At the trial, no evidence was presented that any 
No transcript has been ordered or prepared for the Appeal. 
The parties have stipulated to an Agreed Statement As The Record 
On Appeal. All references herein are to the paragraphs in the 
Agreed Statement (hereinafter "A.S.") 
1 
police officer or other witness had seen the Appellant driving a 
motor vehicle on November 10, 1987. The City did introduce 
testimony from Officer Jim Garner that he had observed the 
Appellant behind the wheel of an automobile at approximately 810 
East 500 South in Bountiful, Utah. Officer Garner testified that 
the vehicle was not moving, and that he never saw the Appellant 
actually driving said vehicle (A.S. 1, 2). Field sobriety tests 
were administered and the Appellant was arrested for Driving 
Under the Influence of an Alcoholic Beverage (A.S. 6). The 
Appellant refused to submit to a chemical test (A.S. 7). 
The Appellant testified on his own behalf. He testified 
that he drove to Wendover, Nevada, and on the return from 
Wendover, the Appellant admitted consuming two (2) beers. The 
Appellant also admitted that he had been the driver of the 
vehicle (A.S. 8). He further testified that he opened a beer 
after his vehicle ran out of gas. He stated that he drank about 
half of that beer prior to the time that Officer Garner arrived 
at the scene and observed the Appellant's motor vehicle stopped 
along the roadway (A.S. 9). 
After the Trial Court read all of the instructions to the 
jury, the City's attorney requested permission to approach the 
bench. At that time, the City's attorney requested that the 
Court include in the elements instruction to the jury that the 
2 
Appellant could be found guilty of the offense of Driving Under 
the Influence if the City proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the Appellant was either driving an automobile on November 10, 
1987, or that the Appellant was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle on the same date (A.S. 10). Appellant's counsel 
urged that it would be necessary to define the legal term of artf 
"actual physical control"f in order for the jury to understand 
the elements of the offense (A.S. 11). The Trial Court 
instructed Appellant's counsel to prepare such an instruction. 
Appellant's counsel did prepare such an instruction and tendered 
it to the Court. The Court refused to give the instruction, and 
Appellant's counsel excepted to the Court's failure to give said 
instruction (A.S. 11). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The term "actual physical control" is a term of art, and is 
not self-explanatory. The Appellant was entitled to a basic 
"elements" instruction to the jury. The Trial Court's refusal to 
submit the proffered instruction to the jury, believing that the 
jury would understand the term "actual physical control", consti-
tuted reversible error. The jury was not instructed concerning 
the elements of the alleged crime, and therefore it cannot be 
determined whether or not the jury properly found each element of 




• AN ACCURATE INSTRUCTION UPON THE BASIC ELEMENTS 
OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE IS ESSENTIAL, 
AND THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
DEFINITION OF THE TERM "ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL" 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR, 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently ruled that an 
accurate instruction upon the basic elements of the offense 
charged is essential, and the failure to so instruct constitutes 
reversible error. In State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980), 
the Supreme Court ruled that the failure of the Trial Judge to 
include the intent element in the basic "elements" instruction in 
a prosecution for theft by deception was reversible error. The 
Court reached this conclusion even though one of the instructions 
included the "Information" instruction which did refer to the 
intent required for the commission of the crime, but did "not 
inform the members of the jury that before returning the verdict, 
they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the 
conscious objective to withhold the property (automobile) per-
manently." Id. at 35. 
The Laine holding was reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 219 (Utah 1986). The Harmon case 
presents a virtually identical factual scenario as that presented 
in the instant matter. There the defendant was charged by an 
Information with robbery, but at trial, the Court granted the 
4 
State's motion to instruct the jury on the lesser included 
offense of Attempted Robbery. In its instructions to the juryf 
however, the Court merely inserted the word "attempted" before 
the word "robbery" in the previously prepared instruction on the 
elements of robbery and then read that to the jury as the ele-
ments instruction for attempted robbery. The Court failed to 
instruct the jury on the specific definition of an attempt. 
In Harmon, the defendant, just as in the case at bar, 
objected to the Court's instruction and requested an instruction 
defining the word "attempt". The trial court refused the defen-
dant's proffered instruction, instead believing the jury would 
understand the word "attempt". Because the jury was not 
instructed concerning the elements of the crime for which the 
defendant was convicted, the Court citing State v. Laine, granted 
the defendant a new trial. 
In the instant matter, the failure of the Trial Court to 
define "actual physical control" constitutes reversible error 
because in the absence of such an instruction, it cannot be 
determined whether or not the jury properly found each element of 
the crime of Driving Under the Influence beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This is so because the jury could have logically 
concluded that the City had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the Appellant was actually driving a motor vehicle while 
5 
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. Although the 
Appellant did admit to drinking two beers during his drive from 
Wendover to Bountiful, a jury could have logically concluded that 
two beers consumed over several hours prior to the driving at 
issue was not a sufficient quantity of alcohol to appreciably 
impair the Appellant's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. 
Thus, if the jury concluded that it was appropriate to 
acquit the Appellant on the driving alternative of Driving Under 
the Influence, then the jury's verdict could only be supported if 
they concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant was 
in "actual physical control" of an operable motor vehicle. The 
Appellant did admit that he had consumed about one-half of a beer 
after his vehicle had run out of gasf and prior to the time that 
the arresting officer arrived at the scene. The jury could have 
concluded that even though the Appellant was not guilty under the 
driving alternative, that he was guilty under the actual physical 
control alternative since, by his own testimony, he had consumed 
two and a half beers by that point in time. Laine and Harmon 
mandate the granting of a new trial in the case at bar. Just as 
in Harmon, "actual physical control" is a term of art and is not 
self-explanatory. The Appellant is entitled to a basic 
"elements" instruction. Because the jury was left to guess at 
the meaning of "actual physical control", the Trial Court's 
6 
failure to instruct the jury on the basic elements was reversible 
error. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Appellant's conviction should be reversed and a new 
trial should be ordered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of April, 1988. 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR., 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, four (4) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, first 
class postage prepaid, this day of April, 1988, to: 
Russell L. Mahan 
Bountiful City Prosecutor 
745 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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WALTER F. BUGDEN, TR. #480 
Attorney for Appellant 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 Fast 200 South - 10 
^alt LaKe City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7 28 2 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
BOUNTIFUL CI^Y, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : AGREED STATEMENT AS THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
v. : 
JF<;<5E G. PAT OMTNO : Case No. 
D?fendant/Apoellant : 
ooOoo 
Tn^ Aopellant, Jesse G. Palomino, bv and through his counsel, 
Walter F. Bugden, Jr.f and the City of Bountiful, by and through 
its counsel, Russell Mahan, hereby stipulate and agree pursuant 
to Rul=» lift) of tn<=> ntah Rules of Appellate Procedure, that the 
follownq statement of Facts constitutes the agreed statement as 
the record on appeal: 
1. ^n November 10, 1987, while on routine patrol at the 
area o. 300 Ease and 500 South, Bountiful City Police Officer 
James Garner observed a cream colored Dodge Aspen parked on the 
Morth side of the street ^ith the front of said vehicle facing 
Fastbound although the vehicle was in the Westbound lane. 
2. The officer observed the Appellant seated in the driver's 
seat oF the vehicle. 
3. When aske3 what the problem was, the Appellant stepped 
-1-
from the driver's side of the car and stated that he had spun 
around on the road and was merely attempting to get the vehicle 
started so he could get on his way. 
4. The officer detected several beer cans on the floor of 
the Apnellant's vehicle. 
5. The officer also observed a strong odor of alcohol 
coming from the Appellant's breath and from the interior of the 
car. 
6. A second Bountiful City Police Officer, Officer Stones, 
responded to the scene, and administered field sobriety tests to 
the Appellant. Tt was the opinion of both Officer Garner and 
Officer Stones that the Appellant failed to adequately perform any 
of the field sobriety tests. 
7. The Appellant was placed under arrest for Driving Under 
the IncLaence of an Alcoholic Beverage and was transported to the 
Bountiful City Police Department. At the oolice station, the 
Appellant was requested to submit to an intoxilyzer test. 
Although the Appellant stated that he understood the request to 
submit to a chemical test, the Appellant nonetheless refused to 
submit to such a test. 
8. The Appellant testified on his own behalf. The Appellant 
testified that he drove to Wendover, Nevada and on the return from 
Wendo^?r the Appellant admitted consuming two beers. The Appellant 
also admitted that he was the driver of the vehicle that both 
Officers Garner and atones observed in Bountiful Cicy. 
9. The Appellant further admitted opening a beer after his 
- ? _ 
vehicle ran out of gas and drinking about half of that beer prior 
to the time that Officer Garner arrived at the scene. 
10. After the Court had instructed the jury, but prior to 
the City's counsel delivering his closing argument, the City's 
counsel requested that the Court include in the elements instruc-
tion to the iury that the Appellant could be found guilty of 
Driving Under the Influence if the jury concluded beyond a reaso-
nable doubt that the Appellant was either driving a motor vehicle 
or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of an alcoholic beverage. 
11. Defense counsel did not object to the City's requested 
instruction, but urged the Court to instruct the jury on the 
meaning of actual physical control. 
12. The Court took a recess and invited defense counsel to 
prepare such an instruction. Defense counsel did prepare an 
instruction and submitted it to the Court. The Court refused to 
qiv« s^M instruction to the jury and defense counsel excepted to 
the Court's refusal. 
l^. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
14. The Aooell^nt moved the Court for a new trial on the 
basis of the Court's refusal to instruct the jury on the meaning 
of actual physical control. An Order denying the Appellant's 
-3-
Motion For A New Trial was signed by the Court on February 22, 
1998 
rO WjKTcW 
DATED t h i s _ J 2^ 1 _ day of - F e b r u a r y , 1988 
uyoiu^-R.otb' 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. , 
Attorney for Appellant < I 
Approved as to form: 
DATED: 
k- J. * C > *- f f, <. RUSSELL MAHAN, 
Attorney Cor Respondent 
FOURTH CTRCUTT COURT: 
JUDGE MARK S. JOHNSON 
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